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Although the business press suggests that "winning the talent war," the attraction and 
retention of key talent, is increasingly pivotal to organization success, executives often report 
that their organizations do not fare well on this dimension. We demonstrate how, through 
integrating turnover and compensation research, the Boudreau and Berger (1985) staffing 
utility framework can be used by I-O psychologists and other HR professionals to address this 
issue. Employing a step-by-step process that combines organization-specific information about 
pay and performance with research on the pay-turnover linkage, we estimate the effects of 
incentive pay on employee separation patterns at various performance levels. We then use the 
utility framework to evaluate the financial consequences of incentive pay as an employee 
retention vehicle. The demonstration illustrates the limitations of standard accounting and 
behavioral cost-based approaches and the importance of considering both the costs and 
benefits associated with pay-for-performance plans. Our results suggest that traditional 
accounting or behavioral cost-based approaches, used alone, would have supported rejecting a 
potentially lucrative pay-for-performance investment. In addition, our approach should enable 
HR professionals to use research findings and their own data to estimate the retention patterns 
and subsequent financial consequences of their existing, and potential, company-specific 
performance-based pay policies. 
The ability to achieve competitive advantage through people depends in large part on the 
composition of the work force. This, in turn, is a function of who is hired, how they are developed, and 
who is retained- the latter of which is the focus of this study. Voluntary employee turnover can be either 
dysfunctional or functional for the organization, depending on who leaves (Boudreau, 1991; Boudreau & 
Berger, 1985; Hollenbeck & Williams, 1986; Trevor, 2001). Both low and high performers are generally 
more likely to leave an organization than are average performers (Jackofsky, 1984; Trevor, Gerhart, & 
Boudreau, 1997; Williams & Livingstone, 1994). Thus, organizations often will shed poor employees 
(functional turnover), but will also fail to retain star employees (dysfunctional turnover). It appears, 
however, that organizational practices can influence the performance distribution of leavers. 
Specifically, though high performers typically may leave the organization more often than do average 
performers, they do not necessarily do so. Although research consistently reports that an organization’s 
pay system affects the probability of voluntary turnover (Dreher, 1982; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992; 
Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000; Harrison, Virick, & William, 1996; Porter & Lawler, 1968; Schwab, 
1991; Steers & Mowday, 1981; Trevor et al., 1997), the probability of high-performer turnover is 
particularly sensitive to the strength of the pay-for-performance link (Trevor et al., 1997). Consequently, 
organizations may be able to design compensation systems to enhance organizational value by targeting 
retention efforts at the dysfunctional high performer turnover. 
This may, in fact, be increasingly happening as organizations in the United States and abroad are 
progressing toward linking pay more strongly to performance (Milkovich & Newman, 2002). Although 
many organizations have expanded their use of plans that reward team, business unit, and corporate 
performance (Milkovich & Newman, 2002), the predominant basis for pay-for-performance continues to 
be individual performance (Hewitt Associates, 2002; IOMA, 2002), and survey data indicate that 
companies believe individual pay-for-performance programs are effective (IOMA, 2002). Although there 
are concerns about the wisdom of pay-for-performance (e.g., Kohn, 1993; Pfeffer, 1998), particularly for 
individual performance, research reviews find ample evidence that pay-for-performance is associated 
with higher performance at both the individual (Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998) and organizational 
levels of analysis (Gerhart, 2000). Such research, however, has not explicitly examined the mechanisms 
through which pay-for-performance plans affect individual behaviors to influence the organizational 
bottom line. One such mechanism involves pay-for-performance’s effects on performance-specific 
turnover, and the associated costs and benefits that contribute to organizational financial performance. 
The professional HR literature suggests that influencing the retention of high performers in 
particular is a crucial matter. Many articles cite the increasing difficulty in obtaining and keeping top 
talent (e.g., Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002; Branch, 1998; Chambers, Handfield-Jones, Hanking, & Michaels, 
1998; Rich, 1999). A report based on interviews of over 5,000 executives and managers (McKinsey & 
Company, 1998), for example, found that 65% of executives believed that they had insufficient talent in 
the ranks of their top 300 leaders while only 10% strongly believed that their companies retained most 
of their high performers. Even with the recent economic slowdown, organizations face increased 
pressures to attract and retain top talent in their most pivotal talent areas. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics projects that, by 2010, the labor supply will grow by 17 million (Fullerton & Toosi, 2001) and 
labor demand will increase by 22.2 million (Berman, 2001), indicating that labor shortages will play 
increasing roles in the future. Moreover, even if a company is reducing employee headcount, voluntary 
attrition is often the first and most attractive option (Sherwyn & Sturman, 2002). Each of these 
circumstances highlights the potential benefits of managerial investments that particularly facilitate top-
performer retention. 
Few would debate the merits of a performance-based pay practice that, all else equal, resulted 
in greater retention of high performers. Unfortunately, all else is far from equal when changing an 
organization’s pay systems. Because such changes will affect total labor costs, individual employee pay 
levels, and subsequent employee behaviors, the critical question becomes one of whether the benefits 
of such a practice outweigh the costs. We propose that although the potential retention benefits of 
incentive pay have been recognized, they have yet to be quantified in dollar terms. Moreover, 
researchers have failed to adequately address actual costs of performance-based bay. Our goal here is 
to provide the first empirical cost-benefit assessment of the viability of performance-based pay. Our 
approach should contribute to the pay-for-performance literature by specifying the circumstances that 
affect the success of pay-for- performance plans. 
Our results should also contribute to practice, as the likelihood that HR professionals would 
apply the research findings to their own organizations should increase if these professionals are 
provided with a viable technique for doing so. In this paper, we demonstrate such a technique. The 
employee movement utility model of Boudreau and Berger (1985) provides the means to evaluate the 
dollar value implications of various pay-for-performance strategies, which we illustrate with a step-by-
step application to a published turnover and pay-for-performance article. In doing so, we (a) 
demonstrate how organizational representatives can use research findings, publicly available 
compensation, and turnover data, or their own data to diagnose, inform, and evaluate their own 
company-specific incentive pay decisions; and (b), demonstrate that this technique will often provide 
different conclusions from typical decision models that use only traditional cost or accounting analysis. 
Utility Analysis Applied to Pay Decisions 
Utility analysis is a tool for cost-benefit analysis that helps quantify the impact of human 
resource interventions (Cascio, 2000). Although utility analysis has been applied to numerous human 
resource program areas, most applications have concentrated in the areas of employee selection and 
training (Boudreau, 1991; Boudreau & Ramstad, 2003b; 1999). The Boudreau and Berger (1985) 
framework represents one of the few applications to employee retention. Klass and McClendon (1996) 
used that framework to examine the pay policy decision of whether to lead, lag, or match the market. 
They gathered parameter information from published studies and simulated effects on employee 
separation and offer acceptance patterns. Results for bank tellers suggested that a lag policy produced 
higher payoffs, although “leading the market” (paying higher than the average) did enhance retention 
and attraction of top candidates. The authors noted that these results did not necessarily suggest using 
a particular pay policy, and showed how simulated reductions in citizenship behavior due to low pay 
might change the results. This was an important initial application of employee movement utility 
principles to decisions about pay. 
In this paper, we focus on a different type of pay decision-how to allocate pay increases across 
employees at different performance levels. Trevor et al. (1997) found that pay policies providing greater 
pay growth for high performers (and less for low performers) substantially increased retention among 
high performers, encouraged separation among low performers, and, thus, increased the value of the 
work force. This is an appealing prospect, but it is unclear whether the enhanced workforce value would 
offset the cost associated with such a reward system. Such costs are quite apparent using traditional 
accounting or behavioral costing models, but such models have limited ability to reflect effects on 
workforce value; furthermore, little data exists on the actual implications of these limitations (Boudreau 
& Ramstad, 2003a; 2003b). It is also unclear to what extent the enhanced workforce value would 
depend on such factors as the pay policy specifics, the retention pattern, and the variability in 
performance. The Boudreau-Berger utility framework provides a method to address these questions. 
Using the Boudreau and Berger (1985) separation/acquisition utility model, our paper presents a 
model that captures the value associated with employee separations (turnover) and acquisitions (hires) 
over time. The model estimates three components in each time period: (a) movement costs-the costs 
associated with employee separations and acquisitions; (b) service costs-the pay, benefits, and 
associated expenses required to support the work force; and (c) service value-the value of the goods 
and services produced by the work force. The dollar-valued implications of a given pay plan, and of the 
subsequent separation and acquisition patterns over time, are estimated by subtracting the movement 
costs and service costs from the service value (i.e., subtracting the pay plan's costs from its benefits). 
Figure 1 shows the steps necessary to compute this estimate and the tables we employ here to illustrate 
these steps. 
The Illustrative Case Study 
We illustrate our approach using a scenario in which a hypothetical company is considering 
implementing a pay-for-performance plan at the end of the year 2003. We assume that the company 
does not currently relate pay to performance, so, under the current strategy, all employees would 
receive the same pay increases over time. We compare the effects of this strategy with those of two 
alternative strategies that place different emphases on pay-for-performance. We choose to evaluate the 
implications of the three possible approaches over a 4-year period (2004 to 2007). Thus, because pay-
for-performance affects turnover differently at different levels of performance (Trevor et al., 1997), the 
2007 workforce would reflect a different performance distribution under each of the three pay 
strategies. By calculating the movement costs, service costs, and service values from 2004 to 2007, we 
can estimate the cumulative effects of the pay strategies over the 4-year period. 1 
We used a number of spreadsheets to make the necessary calculations, with each spreadsheet 
corresponding to a table in this paper. The spreadsheets are available from the lead author upon 
request, although the descriptions we provide here should be sufficient for many readers to create their 
own. We also make a number of assumptions to perform the necessary calculations. These assumptions 
are all based on published research (e.g., Trevor et al., 1997) or publicly available data (e.g., BLS, 2002). 
First, we draw directly from the Trevor et al. (1997) study to estimate (a) the relationship between pay 
growth, performance, and turnover that is captured in their survival analysis (see Appendix) and is used 
to calculate the turnover probabilities at each performance level under each pay strategy; (b) the 
baseline turnover probability necessary to compute those turnover probabilities that are specific to each 
performance level-pay strategy combination; and (c) the performance distribution at the beginning of 
our utility analysis timeframe. 
It should be noted that the Trevor et al. (1997) data are from all 5,143 exempt employees hired 
by a large petrochemical organization between 1983 and 1988. Furthermore, Trevor et al. (1997) 
examined the effects of various strengths of pay-for-performance relationships based on archival data 
on individuals' performance and pay levels; they did not specifically manipulate the pay-for-
                                                          
1 The Boudreau and Berger (1985) model in its purest form would calculate the work force value in each 
intervening year and apply a discount factor to equalize the time value of the dollar amounts. Although these 
economic corrections can yield substantial changes to the estimated value (Sturman, 2000), such embellishments 
do not have a significant effect in this case because the changes in dollar amounts are assumed to be linear, the 
time frame is relatively short, and our focus is on the relative (vs. absolute) value of the different strategies. We 
also did not have information about the organizational tax rate, so we report our results in pretax dollars. Aftertax 
effects could be easily calculated by multiplying the final results by an appropriate aftertax proportion, but the 
relative effects of the options would not be altered. 
performance link as part of either an experimental or quasi-experimental design. Nonetheless, these 
data represent a wide variety of exempt jobs over several years, and the results provide valuable insight 
into the relationships between turnover, pay, and performance. Thus, the results of the Trevor et al. 
(1997) study are useful for our purpose of illustrating our technique. 
 
Second, we use published surveys (BLS, 2002; WorldatWork, 2002) to help generate realistic pay 
strategies, determine starting average pay levels, and estimate benefit costs. Finally, we employ the 
results of published research studies to help provide realistic estimates of the cost of turnover (e.g., 
Johnson, 1995; Solomon, 1988) and the value of different levels of employee performance (Becker & 
Huselid, 1992; Boudreau, 1991; Cascio, 2000; Schmidt & Hunter, 1983). We describe the rationale for 
our assumptions and suggest how professionals might apply each rationale or gather their own data to 
customize the application for their organizations. Thus, our demonstration is intended (a) to provide 
information on the value of pay-for-performance plans and the extent that they should ultimately lead 
to improved organizational financial success; and (b) to enable others to use the method with their own 
company's data, new research findings, and/or their own estimates to create company-specific 
evaluations to facilitate their own decision making regarding the implementation of pay-for-
performance policies. 
 
 
Pay-for-Performance Plans and Performance-Specific Turnover 
Step 1: Specify the Pay-for-Performance Options 
As is evident in Figure 1, the first major phase in estimating the costs and benefits of 
performance-based pay is to make explicit the relevant organizational characteristics and assumptions. 
The initial step within this phase is to specify the pay policy scenarios to be considered. The two key 
parameters needed are: (a) the current pay level in each performance category for the employees to be 
considered; and (b) the relationship between pay growth and performance levels (usually expressed in 
terms of the percentage increase awarded for each performance level). For this second parameter, we 
constructed three hypothetical, but realistic, performance-based pay strategies. Because we intend to 
provide a broad range of potential outcomes, within which most particular organizational results should 
fall, the strategies were chosen to range from conservative to aggressive in terms of the pay-for-
performance link. In terms of performance categories, we adopted the nine performance-rating 
categories used by Trevor et al. (1997), which range from 1.0 = lowest performance to 5.0 = highest 
performance in 0.5 increments, because this will facilitate using other aspects of the Trevor et al. 
situation as an illustration. Trevor et al. (1997) created the nine categories by computing average 
performance over time from a rating system in which “The performance scale ranged from 1 = lowest to 
5 = highest, with the five categories representing levels of consistency in meeting and exceeding the 
basic requirements of the job7, (p. 49). Professionals adopting our utility analysis framework should 
change the performance categories to reflect their own performance assessment approach. 
The details of our three illustrative pay-for-performance plans are shown in Table 1. Pay 
Strategy 1 gives all employees the same average pay increase, regardless of performance level. Data 
suggest that current pay increases average 4% (BLS, 2002; Peck, 2002; WorldatWork, 2002), so we used 
this value for all performance categories in Pay Strategy 1. Pay Strategy 2 creates a pay-performance link 
(i.e., larger pay increases as performance improves) for performers above the middle “3.0” rating, and 
average pay increases (i.e., 4%) to those rated 3.0 and below. Pay Strategy 3 maintains the positive 
reinforcement of Pay Strategy 2, and extends the pay-for-performance link to those below the middle 
rating (i.e., smaller pay increases as performance worsens). Thus, Pay Strategy 1 provides no 
performance link, Pay Strategy 2 is more aggressive, and Pay Strategy 3 is the most aggressive. 
As noted above, in addition to the pay raise strategy, Step 1 requires the setting of an initial pay 
level upon which the pay strategies will be applied. Because our example involves evaluating the pay-
for-performance strategies for white-collar employees, we used the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 
2002) estimate of average 2001 white-collar (nonsales) pay, adjusted for the average salary increases of 
exempt workers for 2002 and 2003 (WorldatWork, 2002). This ultimately yielded a pay level of $47,983 
for the year 2003.2 For illustration, we simply assigned this same initial pay level to every performance 
category. Then, applying the percentage increase associated with each pay strategy and extrapolating 
for 4 future years, we projected the resulting performance-specific pay levels for the year 2007, as 
reported in Table 1. 
In actual organizations, of course, the current pay levels would be available from company 
records. The same forward-projection method can be used based on these initial values. With 
observations of real data, it seems likely that initial pay levels will vary across performance categories, 
reflecting past pay policies, demographics, and performance distributions. Although quite easy to 
                                                          
2 The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides a wealth of information on hourly earnings for diverse groups and 
occupations (see BLS, 2002, Table 3). We used the average hourly earnings and weekly hours of all white-collar 
occupations, excluding sales jobs. The most recent information shows that white-collar, full-time employees 
(excluding sales) earned an average hourly wage of $21.65 and worked an average of 39.4 hours per week in 2001. 
Based on the 29th Annual Report on the ‘2002-2003 Total Salary Increase Budget Survey (Worldatwork, 2002), 
salary increases averaged 3.9% for exempt salaried employees in 2002, and is projected to increase 4.1% for 2003. 
This led us to use an estimated hourly wage of $23.42, for a total salary for 2003 of $47,983. Note again that 
anyone employing the methods described in this paper can simply enter the data from other sources, such as their 
own company's data. The value we chose was intended to capture a broad, generalizable sample. More 
importantly, it is intended to be a reasonable estimate to help illustrate our technique. 
observe in practice, pay-performance distributions are likely quite variable, so no obvious method exists 
to simulate them for our example. Our decision to begin with a uniform pay distribution across 
categories simplifies the presentation but does not otherwise reduce the generalizability of our 
approach. 
Step 2: Determine Turnover Probabilities 
The second step in the making explicit of organizational characteristics and assumptions (i.e., 
the first major phase in Figure 1) is to estimate the probability of separation at each performance level 
for each pay strategy. This step defines the key link between performance-based pay and workforce 
composition. For practitioners, this may represent the most novel element of the model, yet, we believe 
it is quite feasible. We describe several methods for estimating these probabilities. 
Estimation wing existing research literature: Perhaps the most straightforward approach is to 
refer to existing empirical findings. For our hypothetical example, we use the performance level/pay 
strategy specific separation results generated by Trevor et al. (1997). Professionals employing utility 
analysis likely would prefer to access separation probabilities from a study of an employee population 
that resembled their own employees in terms of occupations, industry, and demographics. To date, 
however, the Trevor et al. (1997) study is the only published work from which the performance 
level/pay strategy specific separation probabilities can be estimated. Although future research providing 
such information for different employee populations would be helpful, in their absence, the Trevor et al. 
(1997) results offer a useful starting point. 
Estimation using organizational data: A second option for generating the performance 
level/pay strategy specific separation probabilities that are necessary for the cost-benefit analysis would 
be for professionals to estimate them using their own organization’s data. In most companies, 
separation rates are customarily calculated for entire job categories and are seldom broken down by 
performance levels. Even when separation rates are reported by performance levels, they are rarely 
further broken down to reflect pay growth. Yet, if yearly individual-level information on performance, 
pay level, and separation is available, it can rather easily be converted into the required separation 
probabilities estimates. 
First, professionals can compute each employee’s average pay growth and average employee 
performance over a specified time period (e.g., over the last 3 years). These relatively continuous data 
can then be used to slot employees into performance level/pay strategy categories, such as Table 1’s 27 
categories that were created from all combinations of three pay strategies and nine performance levels. 
This approach would be repeated for all appropriate performance level and pay growth combinations, 
thus yielding counts of employees that fit each category. After compiling these counts, the second step 
would be simply to divide each category’s number of voluntary separations by the number of employees 
in that category. This would yield the estimates of the separation probabilities specific to each 
performance level/pay strategy combination that are necessary for conducting the cost-benefit analysis 
of performance-based pay. 
Although relatively simple to describe, estimating category-specific separation probabilities from 
one’s own organization involves two potentially difficult hurdles. First, to estimate the separation 
probabilities with any degree of reliability, there must be an adequate number of employees in the 
categories of interest. If the number of employees in a given category is low, then the resultant average 
rate of turnover may be strongly influenced by sampling error rather than reflecting an accurate 
estimate of that category’s true turnover likelihood (e.g., a category with one employee mandates an 
unrealistic separation probability estimate of either one or zero). Thus, the HR professional or I-O 
psychologist must be working with relatively few categories and/or with large employee populations. A 
second serious problem with the approach described above is that it will produce separation 
probabilities that are likely to be confounded by other factors that are related to turnover, performance, 
and pay growth, such as pay level, age, gender, and tenure with the organization. Hence, though 
computing performance level/pay strategy specific separation probabilities for one’s own organization is 
relatively simple, its value may be limited. 
Fortunately, two statistical methods are available for dealing with the confounding and 
employee-per-category problems. Although both of these methods require a statistical package and 
reasonable statistical sophistication, I-O psychologists may well have been exposed to one or both of the 
methods. If not, their training still may well have provided them with a methodological foundation 
sufficient to allow them to learn the techniques, particularly with the advances in user-friendly statistical 
software. Alternatively, HR professionals or I-O psychologists could simply hire a consultant to assist 
with the analyses. 
Logistic regression and survival analysis can be used to estimate separation probabilities. Both 
explicitly account for the potential confound described above by statistically controlling for the effects 
of these other variables. The analyses yield partial coefficients that are net of the effects of the 
potentially confounding variables. The partial coefficients are then used to compute separation 
probabilities needed to conduct the cost-benefit analysis. Both methods also exploit the full range of the 
relatively continuous salary growth and performance data, rather than requiring preestablished 
categories that necessarily result in a loss of information. Logistic regression estimates the probability of 
separation over a specified time period. Survival analysis (Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980) computes the 
probability of survival (i.e., not separating) over a specified timespan and accounts for the length of time 
an individual stays before leaving the organization. In other words, survival analysis specifically models 
how long an individual remains with an employer before leaving, whereas logistic regression models 
whether a person leaves or not. Although both methods are appropriate for estimating the separation 
probabilities specific to the performance 1eveUpay strategy combinations of interest, each offers 
advantages under certain circumstances (for a complete discussion of this issue, see Morita, Lee, & 
Mowday, 1993). The Appendix describes the use of survival analysis to calculate the required separation 
probabilities that are specific to each of our performance level/pay strategy combinations. 
Estimated separation probabilities for the example: For our example, we used the survival 
analysis results reported in Trevor et al. (1997), which estimated a survival model from data on a sample 
of exempt employees in one organization. The analysis produced a mathematical function describing 
survival probabilities as a function of salary growth and performance, which we present in the Appendix. 
Substituting a specific salary growth amount and performance level into the equation produces an 
estimated survival probability that is appropriate for that performance level and salary growth 
combination. Thus, we used the equation reported in Trevor et al.'s (1997) Table 4 (p. 54) to compute 
the separation probability (1.0 minus the survival probability), for each performance category under 
each pay strategy, at the end of our example's 4-year period. The estimated separation probabilities are 
presented in the top part of Table 2. 
We caution that our use of the Trevor et al. (1997) survival analysis provides reasonable 
separation probability estimates, rather than definitive ones. It is certainly probable that other factors 
could also influence the probability of turnover. For example, equity theory suggests that even when 
high performers receive the same pay increase (such as under Pay Strategy 2 and Pay Strategy 3), their 
turnover likelihoods may differ as a function of how referent others (e.g., low performers) are 
compensated. Our approach does not take this into consideration. Thus, the reader should keep in mind 
the imperfections associated with relying on any single study, model of turnover, or data set to estimate 
turnover probabilities. 
 Step 3: Determine Performance Distribution and Number of Separations 
So far, we have established the pay increase that individuals in each performance level will 
receive under the different pay policies and we have subsequently established the separation 
probabilities for each performance level/pay strategy category. Next, we need to project the number of 
separations in each performance level/pay strategy category over time. We specified our initial 
hypothetical employee group (those at the end of year 2003) to mirror in size and performance 
distribution the 5,143 employees analyzed by Trevor et al. (1997), which is shown in Table 2 (in actual 
organizations, the initial number of employees in each performance category would be identified 
through a straightforward count). We then multiplied the initial number of employees in each 
performance level/pay strategy category by the appropriate separation probability. Table 2 presents the 
resultant category-specific numbers of employees that separated (and will need to be replaced) and 
employees retained. 
At this point, a traditional analysis of total separations would likely lead to a decision to adopt 
Pay Strategy 2, the moderately aggressive policy through which performers above the midpoint receive 
higher pay increases. As Table 2 indicates, the number of separations over the 4-year analysis period is 
1,326 for Pay Strategy 2, 1,457 for Pay Strategy 1, and 1,716 for Pay Strategy 3. Based only on separation 
rates, Pay Strategy 3 seems the least attractive policy. However, such conclusions are simplistic and 
superficial from a cost/benefits perspective; a more sophisticated and meaningful inference regarding 
the implications of the three pay strategies requires an analysis incorporating critical financial data. 
Estimating the Cost of Pay-for-Performance Plans 
Step 4: Determine Movement Costs 
In Steps 1 through 3, we specified the pay-for-performance options, the estimated separation 
probabilities, and the subsequent numbers of separations and necessary replacements from each 
performance level/pay strategy combination. Hence, one key financial outcome to be considered is the 
projected cost of employee movements into and out of the workforce under each pay policy. As we see 
in Table 2, relative to the retention effects of simply providing everyone with the same salary increase 
(Pay Strategy l), Pay Strategy 2 reduces overall separations, but Pay Strategy 3 increases them. We next 
translate these projected separations and replacements into financial costs. 
We refer to the combined costs of employee separations and replacement acquisitions as 
movement costs. These costs include direct expenses, such as separation costs (e.g., exit interview, 
separation pay), replacement costs (e.g., advertising, travel expenses, interviewing and testing 
candidates), and training costs (e.g., informational literature costs, paying trainers). Movement costs 
also include indirect expenses, such as the lower productivity of new employees as they learn the job, 
time spent by managers having to supervise new employees more directly, and diminished productivity 
of veteran employees as they mentor and help new employees (Cascio, 2000). Although such costs are 
not standard elements of traditional accounting systems, organizations increasingly employ software 
and reporting algorithms that calculate such metrics as turnover costs, costs per hire, and so forth. If 
these are available, one can simply multiply the relevant cost by the number of separations and/or 
replacements that emerge under each pay strategy. 
Data available to calculate movement costs vary widely across companies. When movement 
costs are not readily available from the organization, one can turn to research. For example, Solomon 
(1988) suggested that movement costs range from 1.5 to 2.5 times the annual salary paid for a job 
(Solomon, 1988), and Johnson (1995) suggested that movement costs range from 93% to 200% of the 
position's salary. In our example, we estimated the movement cost associated with each separation as 
two times the average salary of all employees in the year of the separation (note that average salary will 
vary according to pay strategy). We also assumed that each separation is replaced, and, thus, we 
combined all separation and acquisition costs into a single estimate labeled movement costs. Should 
replacement not be expected, such as during a downsizing, separation cost estimates should be applied 
to the number of separations, and replacement acquisition costs should be applied to the number of 
replacements (Boudreau & Berger, 1985). 
Table 3 provides the necessary information to estimate movement costs for our example. At the 
top of the table is the workforce's average salary in 2003 and in 2007 under each of the three pay 
strategies. As noted above, we multiplied this salary by 2.0 to estimate the average movement costs for 
each separation, which is shown for years 2003 and 2007. We then subtracted the 2003 average 
movement cost from the 2007 average movement cost and divided by four to get yearly movement cost 
increase, which we added to the 2003 average movement cost to get the 2004 average movement cost. 
This was added to the 2007 average movement cost and the sum was divided by two to compute the 
average (2004-2007) movement cost per separation. Table 3 also provides the total projected number of 
separations/replacements from 2004 to 2007, which were calculated in Table 2. Total movement costs 
for each pay strategy over the 4-year period were then calculated by multiplying each pay strategy's 
total number of projected separations/replacements by each pay strategy's average movement cost per 
separation/replacement. 
Table 3's total estimated movement costs were $154.67 million, $142.05 million, and $181.80 
million for Pay Strategies 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Compared to Pay Strategy 1 (giving equal pay 
increases to everyone), the turnover reduction associated with the policy of linking pay and 
performance for high performers (Pay Strategy 2) saves $12.61 million in movement costs over four 
years. Linking pay and performance for both high and low performers (Pay Strategy 3), however, creates 
additional separations among low performers and, thus, incus 4-year movement costs of $27.13 million 
and $39.75 million more than those incurred through Pay Strategies 1 and 2, respectively. 
 Some of these costs would be evident with standard accounting tools, to the extent that they 
represent “out-of-pocket” costs such as fees to search firms or consultants providing exit interviews. 
However, as mentioned above, many of these costs (e.g., staff time spent in processing separations and 
acquisitions) are “opportunity costs,” and only a portion of these savings (costs) would be recorded by 
the accounting system. Thus, our analytical approach offers the advantage of a more complete cost 
analysis for incentive pay strategies. Still, movement costs represent only one of the crucial financial 
implications of using pay-for-performance to manage performance and turnover. Hence, we next 
address the pay strategies’ substantial implications for differences in costs associated with pay levels, 
benefits, and other service costs. 
Step 5: Estimate Future Service Costs 
Service costs are the total costs required to retain and support the work force, and, thus, include 
pay and benefits (Boudreau & Berger, 1985), the latter of which is typically the largest service cost 
component other than pay. In some cases, service costs may vary with employee performance. For 
example, there may be significant bonuses or stock options, or higher performers may use significantly 
more materials or resources than lower performers. In these cases, which would tend to be of more 
relevance in executive populations, such variability in service costs should also be taken into account. 
Absent such factors, estimating service costs simply involves adjusting projected salary levels upward to 
reflect additional service costs (i.e., benefits), multiplying the resulting values by the number of 
employees in each year, and summing the products across years. Because we define total service costs 
as salary plus benefits in our example, we estimate each year’s service costs by estimating the ratio of 
total remuneration (employee benefits plus salary) to salary, and then multiplying this ratio by projected 
salary levels under each pay policy. 
In Table 3, we had established, for each pay strategy, the average salary levels for the full work 
force in 2003 and 2007. Because we assumed that benefits were 37% of salary (US. Department of 
Labor, 2001), we multiplied Table 3’s average salary levels by 1.37 to reflect the 2003 and 2007 average 
service costs for each pay strategy (see Table 4). Using the assumption that service costs increased 
linearly from 2003 to 2007, we then computed, for each of the three pay strategies, (a) the average 
service cost increase (2007 service cost minus 2003 service cost, divided by four), (b) 2004 service cost 
(2003 service cost plus the average service cost increase), (c) the average 2004-2007 service cost (2004 
service cost plus 2007 service cost, divided by two), and (d) the total 2004-2007 service cost (average 
2004-2007 service cost times four, the number of years in our simulation, times 5,143, the total number 
of employees in each year). 
An implication of our decision to use the workforce average service costs to estimate total 
service costs is that it implicitly assumes that replacement employees will be paid at the average level of 
the workforce they enter. The framework of this model can certainly accommodate other assumptions 
(e.g., stronger pay-performance links will attract better performers who will be paid more), and would 
allow practitioners to incorporate such data when appropriate. We adopted the workforce-average 
assumption for simplicity. 
Pay Strategy 2 yielded the highest service costs; it is projected to cost $13.76 million more than 
Pay Strategy 1 (no performance-pay relationship). Under Pay Strategy 2, pay is always equal (for 
performers at or below the performance midpoint) or higher (for performers above the midpoint) than 
in Pay Strategy 1. Pay Strategy 3 raises the pay for higher performers, but also lowers pay for lower 
performers, resulting in costs of $2.94 million less over 4 years than Pay Strategy 1, and $16.70 million 
less than Pay Strategy 2. 
Service costs (i.e., pay and benefits) are highly visible to standard accounting systems. In fact, 
one could argue that they are the most visible elements of human capital in standard accounting. Thus, 
if standard accounting were used to evaluate these pay policies, the costs shown in Table 4 would likely 
be quite evident, and would perhaps suggest an argument for Pay Strategy 3 to organizational 
constituents who rely on accounting information for their decisions. Given that the movement costs 
analysis suggested Pay Strategy 3 as the least economical approach, however, it is clear that relying on 
only a single type of cost information may well provide an inaccurate basis for a decision. When we do 
aggregate the total movement and total service cost data from Tables 3 and 4, we see that Pay Strategy 
3 is the most expensive, costing over $23 million more than Pay Strategy 2 and over $24 million more 
than Pay Strategy 1. 
 
Consequently, from a cost-based perspective, we might conclude that undertaking an aggressive 
pay-for-performance system to “win the talent war” is not worth the investment. We instead caution 
that such an inference (and any decisions based on it) is at the least premature and is potentially 
detrimental to the organization. High performers provide greater value than do low performers, and any 
assessment of an HR program that differentially affects the performance distribution of the workforce 
must account for this. HR investments must be examined for both their “efficiency” and “effectiveness” 
(Boudreau & Ramstad, 2003b). Hence, having addressed the movement and service costs implications of 
the three pay strategies’ effects on turnover, we next turn to the strategies’ implications for workforce’s 
value, an often overlooked but absolutely essential consideration when assessing the financial 
practicality of human resource interventions. 
Estimating the Value of Pay-for-Performance Plans 
Step 6: Determine Service Value 
Although our analyses have focused on the cost implications of the pay-for-performance 
strategies, such strategies also can produce value through the elimination of poor performers (and their 
subsequent replacement by average performers), and, in particular, the retention of high performers, 
whose retention is especially sensitive to pay-for-performance effects (Trevor et al., 1997). Moreover, 
when differences in individual performance are high (Le., when a high performer is worth much more to 
the organization than an average performer), retaining top employees and eliminating poor employees 
may yield value that far outweighs the associated costs (Boudreau & Berger, 1985; Boudreau, 1991; 
Boudreau & Ramstad, 1999; 2003a; 2003b). 
To examine the potential effects of performance-based pay on workforce value, we need to 
estimate the dollar value of individual performance variation. This will allow us to estimate the effect 
that changes in the workforce's performance distribution will have on workforce value. Our data provide 
estimates of changes in the performance ratings, so we must convert ratings to dollar values. This 
conversion method requires two components (Boudreau & Berger, 1985): (a) the dollar value of the 
average performance level; and (b) the incremental value of deviations from that average performance 
level.3 
We employed the Schmidt and Hunter (1983) approach, which assumes that the value of the 
average performance level would equal 1.754 times the average wage at that level. For the 2003 work 
force, we multiplied Table 3's average salary of $47,983 by 1.754 to obtain a service value of $84,162 
per person. For the 2007 work force, consistent with the estimate of average service costs above, we 
estimated average salary as that which would have been produced by four years of average salary 
increases, beginning in 2004. As noted in Table 3, the average 2007 salary under Pay Strategy 1, which 
allocates average salary increases across the performance distribution, is estimated to be $56,133. 
Multiplying this salary by 1.754 produces an average work force value estimate of $98,457 per person. 
                                                          
3 There is no single accepted method of estimating the dollar value of average performance among workers or 
applicants. Some research has suggested that average performance value can be estimated equal to the average 
compensation of the work p u p (Boudreau, 1991, p. 654; Raju, Burke, & Normand, 1990. p. 9). However, it seems 
unlikely that average-performing employees produce only enough value to offset their direct wage costs. 
Considering the other service costs that are incurred, and the need for organizations to obtain a positive return on 
costs, a higher level of average service value seems likely. Based on an analysis of wage and productivity estimates 
in the national income accounts of the United States, Schmidt and Hunter (1983) proposed assuming that the ratio 
of average dollar value to average wage is approximately 1.754. 
These 2003 and 2007 average service value estimates are shown in “average service value” section of 
Table 5. 
 
For the second component necessary to estimate the value associated with each employee, we 
needed an estimate for the value of each performance level above and below the average. Combined 
with the estimate for the average value of individuals’ performance, this will allow us to calculate the 
value of each of the nine performance levels in both 2003 and 2007. In this study, and probably 
characteristic of most organizations, we had no direct estimates of the dollar value of particular 
performance levels. Hence, we used an estimation approach typical of utility analysis studies (e.g., 
Boudreau, 1991; Boudreau & Ramstad, 2003b). Utility analysis typically employs an estimate of the 
value of a one-standard-deviation difference in employee value, referred to as SDy with SDy often 
approximated as equal to a given percentage of salary (Boudreau, 1991; Cascio, 2000). Thus, someone 
who performs one standard deviation above average (i.e., someone who is in the 84th percentile of 
performance) is estimated to be worth more than an average performer by a value equal to SDy. Using 
the SDy term, we can compute the value of each performance category relative to the average. 
A recurring problem with using SDy is that it is unlikely to be estimated precisely (Boudreau, 
1991; Cascio, 2000). Furthermore, its impact on final estimates of the value of a utility estimate is often 
quite significant (Boudreau, 1991). Thus, we investigated three potential values. As a very conservative 
approach, we assumed that SDy would equal 30% of average salary. This is substantially less than 
Schmidt and Hunter’s (1983) 40% recommendation, which has been characterized as a conventional 
benchmark (Becker & Huselid, 1992), a safe estimate (Schmidt, Hunter, Outerbridge, & Trattner, 1986), 
and a conservative estimate (Judiesch, Schmidt, & Mount, 1992). We also used 60% of average salary as 
a somewhat conservative estimate, and we used 90% of average salary as what we believe to be a more 
realistic estimate.4 In other words, our three estimates suggest that an employee performing better 
than 84% of the employee population is worth 30% of salary, 60% of salary, or 90% of salary more to the 
organization than an average performer (i.e., someone performing at the 50th percentile) in the same 
job. 
In order to move from these SDy estimates to estimates of each employee’s service value, we 
first used the observed distribution of employee performance to compute the standardized z-score 
corresponding to each of the nine performance ratings. This transformation, accomplished through 
subtracting the mean performance score from each performance category rating and then dividing by 
the performance standard deviation, produces a performance distribution with a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. For example, performance category 1.5 received a z-score of -1.89 through 
subtracting the average performance rating of 2.764 from 1.5 and dividing by the standard deviation of 
0.668. The z-scores, which represent the number of standard deviations that each performance category 
rating deviates from the performance mean, are listed in the fifth row of data in Table 5. 
We assumed that the z-scores associated with each raw performance score would remain 
constant from 2003 to 2007. That is, although the actual distribution of workers across performance 
categories changes from 2003 to 2007, we assumed that the value of performance at each performance 
level did not change. For example, a performance rating of 4 in 2003, which was 1.850 standard 
deviations above the mean in 2003, provided value to the employer equal to mean performance’s value 
plus the product of 1.850 and SDy. We assumed, regardless of the actual number of employees who 
received a score of 4 in 2007, the financial value of an individual with a performance rating of 4 in that 
year would be equal to 2007 mean performance’s value plus the product of 1.850 and SDy. 
                                                          
4 Support of the 90% approach is provided by Becker and Huselid (1992) who found direct observations of fell in 
the 74% to 100% of mean salary range. Moreover, because researchers generally contend that SDy increases as job 
complexity increases (e.g., Judiesch et al., 1992), our 30% and 60% SDy values would appear to have additional 
support as conservative estimates given our sample of all exempt hires in a large company. 
For 2003, we estimated average salary as $47,983 (from Table 1), producing Sa, estimates of 
$14,395 (i.e., 0.3 x $47,983), $28,790 (i.e., 0.6 x $47,983), and $43,185 (i.e., 0.9 x $47,983) for the 30%, 
60%, and 90% SDy scenarios, respectively. For 2007, estimated average salary was $56,133 (from Table 
1), producing, at the 30%, 60%, and 90% SDy scenarios, estimated Sa, levels of $16,840 (i.e., 0.3 x 
$56,133), $33,680 (i.e., 0.6 x $56,133), and $50,520 (i.e., 0.9 x $56,133). Multiplying these SDy estimates 
(i.e., the appropriate dollar value of a one standard deviation performance difference) by the z-scores 
(i.e., the number of standard deviations the performance category is from the mean) produced the 
“incremental” (beyond the average) dollar values corresponding to each performance rating level for 
each SDy, assumption (see Table 5). Thus, under the 60% assumption in 2007, an employee at 
performance level 5.0 is worth $112,726 more than an average employee (i.e., $56,133 x 0.60 x 3.347). 
The sums of the average service values for the workforce and the incremental service values for each 
performance category produced the individual service values for each performance category that are 
reported in the bottom section of Table 5. Thus, the last six lines of data in Table 5 represent, for each 
unique combination of performance level (1.0 - 5.0 at half point intervals), year (2003 and 2007), and 
SD, scenario (30%, 60%, and go%), the individual service value for each employee. 
With individual service values determined for both 2003 and 2007, we can now compute the 
total service value for the workforce under each of the three pay strategies. For 2003 (for all three pay 
strategies), we calculated the total service value of the workforce by multiplying each performance 
category’s individual service value by the corresponding quantity of employees in the performance 
category, and adding the products. Thus, for example, Table 5’s individual service value of $1 15,888 for 
SDy = 60% and performance = 3.5 in 2003 is multiplied by 672 (the number of employees in that 
performance category) to yield the $77,876,736 figure in Table 6 (under SDy = 60% and performance = 
3.5). This $77,876,736 is then added to the similarly computed values for the other eight performance 
categories to produce, when SDy = 60%, Table 6‘s total 2003 service value of $432,351,857. This is our 
estimate of what the workforce is worth to the employer in 2003 under the assumption that being one 
standard deviation above average in performance is worth 60% of an average performer’s salary. We 
note that total service values are the same in 2003 regardless of pay strategy (though they do differ 
across SDy assumptions) because the three pay strategies had yet to result in the different performance-
specific turnover patterns that begin in 2004. 
For 2007, calculation of the total service value of the workforce is slightly more complex, as the 
computations for those employees retained over the 4-year analysis differ from the computations 
required for those hired as replacements during the 4-year period. For the retained employees, 2007 
total service value calculation closely resembles the approach to 2003, where Table 5’s 2003 individual 
service values for each SDy level and performance category combination were multiplied by the quantity 
of retained employees for each performance category and these products were summed. In 2007, 
however, the three pay strategies’ different effects on performance-specific turnover result in pay 
strategy-specific numbers of retained employees in each performance category. Consequently, we need 
to conduct the individual service value by employee quantity multiplications separately for each pay 
strategy to get the 2007 estimates. Thus, Table 5’s 2007 individual service values for each SD, level and 
performance category combination were multiplied by the quantity of retained employees for each 
performance category under each pay strategy and these products were summed. For example, Table 
5’s individual service value of $129,611 for SDy = 30% and performance = 4.0 in 2007 is multiplied by 
231,282, and 282 (the number of retained employees in that performance category under the three pay 
strategies, as listed in Table 7) to yield the $29,940,141, $36,550,302, and $36,550,302 figures in Table 7 
(under SDy = 30%, performance = 4.0, and Pay Strategies 1, 2, and 3, respectively). Thus, the final nine 
rows of data in Table 7 chronicle, for each SDy and pay strategy combination, the combined service value 
of all retained employees in 2007 at each performance level. The final column for each of these nine 
rows provides total service values across performance categories. 
Having computed 2007 service value for retained employees, we next address the 2007 value of 
those employees hired to replace the employees that separated during the 2004-2007 window. These 
replacement employees were assumed to have an individual service value equal to the average 
individual service value of retained employees under Pay Strategy 1 for each of the SDy assumptions. 
Thus, for example, Table 8's average individual replacement employee service value of $101,594 when 
SDy = 60% was computed by dividing Table 7's total retainee service value of $374,575,510, which is 
under Pay Strategy 1 with SDy = 60%, by 3,687, which is Table 7's total retainees under Pay Strategy 1. 
We note that using Pay Strategy 1's retainee service value for all replacements assumes that the 
recruiting effectiveness and job performance of replacement employees are not affected by the 
compensation system. Because the average service value of retained employees under Pay Strategies 2 
and 3 is greater than the average service value of employees retained under Pay Strategy 1, this 
provides a conservative estimate of replacement service value under the two pay strategies with pay-
for-performance links. The total service value of replacement employees for each pay strategy and SDy 
combination is equal to the pay strategy-specific number of replacements times the SDy specific average 
service value. These totals are reported in the bottom three rows of data in Table 8. 
 Finally, Table 8's service values of the replacements and Table 7's service values of retained 
employees were added to produce the estimated 2007 total service value for each pay strategy and SDy 
level combination, as shown in Table 9. We used these 2007 total service values, as well as the 2003 
total service values from Table 6, to compute total service value across all years in Table 10. As we had 
done with total service costs computations, we calculated the 4-year stream of service value levels by 
assuming that service value rose linearly in each performance category between 2003 and 2007. Thus, 
for each pay strategy and SDy combination, we computed (a) the average service value increase (2007 
service value minus 2003 service value, divided by four); (b) 2004 service value (2003 service value plus 
the average service value increase); (c) the average 2004-2007 service value (2004 service value plus 
2007 service value, divided by 2); and (d), the total 2003-2007 service value (average 2003-2007 service 
value, times four, the number of years in our simulation). 
 
  
Under all assumptions about SDy the 2007 and total service values are lowest when giving all 
employees average pay increases (Pay Strategy 1), are higher when giving high performers high pay 
increases and all others average increases (Pay Strategy 2), and are highest when the pay-for-
performance link was strongest (Pay Strategy 3). Compared to Pay Strategy 1, which gives all employees 
average pay increases, Pay Strategy 2 prompts more high-performing and highly paid employees to stay, 
and their value enhances the work force. Pay Strategy 3 augments this effect by encouraging the 
turnover of low performers, who subsequently are replaced with workers whose expected value is that 
of average workers under Pay Strategy 1. 
 Hence, whereas our cost analysis suggested that Pay Strategy 3 was the least effective and Pay 
Strategy 1 was the most effective, our analysis of workforce value indicates the exact opposite. 
Obviously, relying only on either cost or value estimates would be shortsighted. The critical question is 
whether the service value benefits of a strong pay-for-performance link outweigh the costs (Boudreau, 
1991; Boudreau & Ramstad, 2003a; 2003b). 
Step 7: Determining the Final Utility-Is Pay -for-Performance worth It? 
At this point, we return to the flow chart in Figure 1 and the question that motivated this 
research effort: Is it worth it to use pay-for-performance in an attempt to win the war for talent? To 
speak to this, we began by specifying three pay-plan strategies and estimating the subsequent turnover 
probabilities and performance distributions we would expect under each. Using this turnover and 
performance information, we then addressed costs for each pay plan through the estimation of 
expenses associated with employee movement out of and into the workforce and with the pay and 
benefits for the workforce. Having estimated costs, we turned to the benefits dimension of the cost-
benefit analysis and estimated the value of the retained workforce and of the replacement employees. 
Thus, we have estimated the three components for the decision of whether pay-for-performance makes 
sense in our example: (a) the 4-year stream of movement costs; (b) the 4-year stream of service costs; 
and (c), the 4-year stream of service value. Now, we combine these components to estimate the relative 
value of the three pay strategies by taking the stream of service value and subtracting the stream of 
service costs and movement costs (Boudreau & Berger, 1985). The relevant amounts are summarized in 
Table 11 for each pay strategy and SDy, assumption combination. 
These results suggest a different conclusion from the cost analysis presented earlier. Recall that 
traditional compensation-cost analyses may have led decision makers to the conclusion that a strong 
link between pay and performance would be unwise given its extreme cost, and that although a 
moderate pay-for-performance link was not much more expensive than having no link, there were no 
cost-based data to strongly suggest it as a compelling alternative. When the potential benefits of 
workforce value are accounted for, however, it becomes clear that investments in performance-based 
pay may hold the potential for significant organizational improvement. Table 11 indicates that even 
under our most conservative SDy assumption, pay-for-performance plans yielded greater net values than 
did the noncontingent pay strategy. That is, by fully incorporating both costs and benefits into our 
assessment, we find that, under all of our conditions, pay-for-performance is indeed a valuable 
investment. Moreover, as SDy (i.e., the value associated with performance differences) became larger, 
the payoff to pay-for-performance increased dramatically, ultimately (i.e., at So, = 90%) resulting in 
advantages relative to the noncontingent pay from Pay Strategy 1 of over $26 and $56 million dollars for 
the partially contingent and highly contingent pay strategies, respectively. 
 
Discussion 
This analysis suggests that even under conservative assumptions about the value of 
performance variability among employees, the 4-year financial benefit of linking pay to performance in 
this company would be substantial. When these SDy assumptions are closer to what we believe to be 
more realistic (i.e., if job performance differences have greater value to an organization), the present 
model reveals the potentially high payoff from investments in performance-based pay. Moreover, our 
analysis vividly illustrates the limitations of standard accounting and behavioral cost-based approaches 
for identifying the critical variables and, thus, the appropriate pay strategy. 
Simplifying Decisions 
Because utility analysis can be rather complex, we used a number of simplifying decisions here. 
First, we assumed that replacement employees would be of average performance level (and, thus, 
average service value). This implicitly assumes that pay-for-performance would not influence applicant 
attraction, even though research suggests that the degree to which pay and performance are linked 
does in fact matter to applicants (Cable & Judge, 1994). Second, in focusing on the relationship between 
pay-for-performance and turnover, we made no provisions for whether the performance-based pay 
would actually improve workforce performance (net of retention effects). This implicit modeling of no 
effect of performance-based pay on performance is particularly noteworthy given that the contingent 
pay plan in the Trevor et al. (1997) study was sufficiently well designed to elicit a performance-specific 
retention pattern. Third, we were working with the relatively normally distributed performance 
distribution from the Trevor et al. sample. Although using this distribution simplified matters by allowing 
us to make use of other aspects of the Trevor et al. study, we recognize that many performance 
distributions may be characterized by a greater proportion of employees being rated in the top two or 
three performance categories and by the subsequent negative skew. The Trevor et al. distribution arose 
because the organization, consistent with its individualistic and hierarchical culture, encouraged 
differentiation among employees during performance appraisal. In addition, because 2evor et al. used 
averaged performance levels (with a mean of 3.05 performance ratings per employee), such factors as 
change in performance over time and random error in ratings combined to reduce the likelihood of 
having an average rating in the very top or bottom performance levels. To the extent that an 
organization with an aggressive pay-for-performance plan does encourage or mandate a normal 
performance distribution, however, the implications are noteworthy. For example, the system allocates 
large raises to the relatively few high performers, who should then be satisfied, motivated, and likely to 
remain; in contrast, the system also may frustrate, demotivate, and ultimately result in increased 
turnover among employees that might be reasonably high performers but were not rated as such as a 
result of the forced distribution. 
We emphasize that each of the three simplifying decisions was made to facilitate our 
presentation rather than strengthen our results. Indeed, each decision actually weakens the results’ 
apparent support for performance-based pay. In unreported analyses, we incorporated into the utility 
analysis improved applicant quality under Pay Strategies 2 and 3, improved performance (net of 
retention effects) under Pay Strategies 2 and 3, and a more negative skew in the performance 
distribution. In each case, these alternative approaches to the decision in question resulted in a larger 
net advantage for Pay Strategy 2 and, to an even greater extent, for Pay Strategy 3. Thus, the analyses 
we presented here are a simplified and conservative approach. The spreadsheets available from the first 
author can be adapted to test such alternative assumptions. 
On Overcoming the “Futility of Utility” 
Our simplifying decisions notwithstanding, the analyses presented here entail much detail and 
speculation that, according to utility analysis criticism, might hinder their acceptance in managerial 
ranks. Indeed, we are quite aware of the “futility of utility” (Latham & Whyte, 1994; Whyte & Latham, 
1997) findings in which utility analysis appeared to reduce managerial support for an HR intervention. To 
a large extent, the futility of utility problem likely resides within the presenter and recipients of utility 
analysis data, rather than with utility analysis itself. In defense of utility analysis, Sturman (2000) 
concludes that managers need to understand utility analysis and be trained in the use of the technology. 
Citing the necessity of managers making decisions based on the Merton and Scholes options pricing 
formula to have experience in finance and economics, Sturman (2000) argued that “For a complex 
decision making tool to be useful, the users of the decision aid must desire the information it provides 
and be trained in its use” (p. 297). Hence, rather than being apologists for the complexity of utility 
analysis, we believe that in-house I-O psychologists should attempt to convey that it is important for key 
stakeholders to have some basic grounding in sophisticated human resource decision making. Given that 
labor costs often comprise over half of all operating costs (Milkovich & Newman, 2002), training decision 
makers in a decision tool designed to inform as to the optimal way to allocate these costs would appear 
to be a valid undertaking. On the presenter side, Cronshaw (1997), after participating as the expert 
utility presenter in the Whyte and Latham (1997) “futility” study, contended that “it is not utility analysis 
per se that imperils I-O psychologists, but the intemperate way it is often used. In effect, the messenger 
kills the message” (p. 614). Cronshaw advocated that utility analysis should be presented as an 
informational tool rather than as a “persuasive tool in a one-sided (and often self-serving) attempt to 
‘sell’ innovations to managers” (p. 614). 
Boudreau and Ramstad (1999; 2002) noted that the powerful influence of disciplines such as 
finance and marketing evolved from their focus on enhancing decisions about the key resource (money 
or customers), rather than on selling accounting or sales programs, and suggested that the influence of 
HR and I-O professionals will increase with a similar focus on talent decisions. They suggested (Boudreau 
& Ramstad, 2002, 2003a; 2003b) the HC BRidge®decision model for “talent” resources that draws upon 
well developed decision models to delineate three fundamental elements: efficiency, effectiveness, and 
impact. The present analysis vividly shows the value of integrating “efficiency” (payroll and movement 
costs); “effectiveness” (changes in movement patterns); and “impact” (value of improvements in 
performance) into a decision support model, and the dangers of decision frameworks based solely on 
efficiency or effectiveness alone. 
In addition to these emphases on decision-maker training and on presenting utility analysis as 
an informative tool rather than marketing it as a panacea, we also offer a few additional suggestions 
that might assist the I-O psychologist in communicating utility analyses. First, expectations should be set 
at the outset by affirming that the evaluation will be somewhat complex, just as would be expected 
from manufacturing, finance, or accounting. Any simplistic attempt to estimate performance-based 
pay’s effects on the bottom line would be superficial and incomplete. Second, communicating the utility 
analysis would probably benefit from an initially broad explanation. Perhaps using something similar to 
our Figure 1 as a guide, the practitioner should emphasize the simple cost-benefit concepts of 
movement costs, service costs, performance-specific retention, and the critical, but often overlooked, 
workforce value. We believe that it would be wise to continually hearken back to these big picture 
concepts, with emphasis on effects rather than on measures (Cascio, 2000) and technical details 
(Hoffman, 1996). Third, acceptance may be facilitated via emphasis on the conservative nature of the 
assumptions, decisions, and subsequent estimates (Hoffman, 1996). Finally, highlighting the rationale 
for these assumptions and decisions should demystify them, and using the spreadsheets to 
instantaneously show the effects of changing them may provide valuable “best case” and “worse case” 
scenarios. Together, these recommendations should assist in indicating that well designed performance-
based pay is worth considering and that HR is able to quantitatively evaluate the relevant alternatives. 
Limitations and Conclusions 
Several limitations are noteworthy. Our results reflect one organization's characteristics, such as 
plan specifics, the individual job performance distribution, and the relationship between pay-for-
performance and turnover. The extent to which this organization, its employees, and our conclusions 
are representative of other firms and employees with regard to these factors is unknown. What is 
critical, however, is that the approach we took to finding these results can be applied in a wide variety of 
situations, thus enabling the examination of external validity. A second limiting factor in our study is that 
there may be additional pay strategy-specific training costs or administrative costs that we did not 
include. We believe, however, that such costs could easily be incorporated into this framework. Third, as 
discussed throughout this study, we made a number of assumptions and decisions in order to conduct 
the analyses. Although we believe that we took the most logical and conservative approaches at these 
junctures, viable arguments could be made for approaches different from our own. Fourth, although we 
modeled employees' performance levels as stable over time, research has shown that employee 
performance levels change over time (e.g., Deadrick, Bennett, & Russell, 1997; Ployhart & Hakel, 1998; 
Sturman & Trevor, 2001). Furthermore, changes in performance levels are related to the likelihood of 
turnover, even after controlling for the effects of current performance levels (Harrison et al., 1996; 
Sturman & Trevor, 2001). Considering the movement of employees between different performance 
categories across years, and the implications of these movements for forecasting turnover, would 
certainly add complexity to the model we presented. It may be valuable for future research to explore 
the implications of these model refinements. 
The method we describe involves a significant amount of calculation, but is relatively simple to 
replicate on a spreadsheet. Actual replication may require some customization to fit a specific 
company's profile, but the basic premise of the methods should be the same. We hope that this 
demonstration will inspire organizations to more fully tap available research findings to help them 
enhance their HR policy decision making. We also hope that this paper helps demonstrate the value of 
research findings like those reported in Trevor et al. (1997) and will be complemented by future 
research on additional factors that may influence the pay-for-performance link with turnover. For 
example, satisfaction with different types of pay-for-performance plans (e.g., raises vs. bonuses) can 
have different effects on outcomes of organizational interest, such as job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment (Sturman & Short, 2000). Ideally, the research presented here will encourage extensions of 
this work that can prove valuable for both understanding HR practices in general and for evaluating 
specific HR policies. 
Organizations of all types will likely respond to increasing pressures to “win the talent war” by 
employing all available tools to enhance attraction, selection, and retention processes. A formidable tool 
in this endeavor is the accumulated knowledge available from I-O psychology and HR research. The 
method described here illustrates how utility analysis can be used to demystify and integrate this 
research, making it a more practical decision-making tool, and, thus, a more potent influence on 
significant strategic organizational goals (Boudreau, 1991; Boudreau & Ramstad, 1997; 1999; 2002; 
2003a; 2003b). 
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Appendix 
Computing Separation Probabilities Using Survival Analysis Results 
Our estimation uses the survival analysis from Trevor et al.’s (1997) Table 4 (model 1). 
Probability of survival = S(0)e(Sx) 
where S(0) = baseline probability of survival, which was 0.77, 
β = a vector of survival analysis regression coefficients,  
χ = a vector of independent variables,  
(βχ) = 4.941 + 0.314 x Salary Growth - 2.541 x Performance + 0.553 x Performance2 - 0.020 x 
Performance3 + 0.007 x Salary Growth3 - 0.663 x Salary Growth x Performance + 0.071 x Salary Growth x 
Performance 
The salary growth data used to estimate the equation above was measured in thousands of 
dollars. Thus, to use the equation, our example’s percentage increases had to be converted to a parallel 
salary growth measure for each pay strategy and performance level combination. ?b do so, we 
determined the average pay growth under each strategy by subtracting 2003 pay from 2007 pay, 
dividing by 4, and then dividing this amount by 1,000. 
For example, under Pay Strategy 3 and Performance Level 2.5, the average pay increase was 
([$54,005 - $47,983]/4)/1,000= 1.5055. The table below lists the salary growth for each pay strategy and 
performance level. 
 
Next, we need to estimate separation probability (i.e., 1 - probability of survival): 
1 -S(0)e(βχ) 
For example, for performers rated at 5.0 under Pay Strategy 2, the pay increase of 8% translates 
to an average dollar increase (in thou- sands) of 4.3243, which yields a separation probability = 1 - -77 
e(βχ)= 1-.77e(4.941-5.467)=1-.77(0.5910)=1-.086=.14. Table 2 for separation probabilities at each performance 
level/pay strategy combination. 
The 4.941 constant in the (βχ) calculation resulted from adding the estimated model constant 
(6.810) from Trevor et al.3 (1997) equation to the sum of the model terms that included neither 
performance nor salary growth (e.g., age, promotions). These terms were evaluated at the means of the 
respective x variables. As an aside, we advocate centering variables prior to conducting hazard analyses, 
which causes the model constant and variables set at their means to drop out, thus simplifying the 
calculation of survival probabilities (Retherford & Choe, 1993; Trevor, 2001). See Trevor (2001) and 
Morita et al. (1993) for more on computing survival probabilities. 
